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4. Thereafter the Missouri cases have consistently classified
the garnishment of intangible debts as a proceeding in personam
in relation to the garnishee, and as a proceeding in rem in rela-
tion to the principal debtor.
5. A rule of garnishment, such as that laid down in Harris v.
Balk must reasonably meet the needs of the forum with respect
to commercial control, without undue interference with legiti-
mate interests of other states. But it must go further. Some
means must be found to protect the interests of the principal
debtor, and to guard against the possibility of double liability
of the garnishee, which is inherent in the dictum in Harris v.
Balk. On this phase of the problem there are no Missouri cases.
Of the suggested solutions, it is submitted that a statute requir-
ing the plaintiff to post a bond indemnifying the garnishee and
the principal debtor against possible loss has the greatest merit.
RALPH T. SMITH.
PERSONAL DISQUALIFICATIONS OF ADMINISTRATORS*
At early common law there were no statutes governing the
selection of the administrator of a decedent's estate.' Today in
all American states, 2 as well as in England,3 there are statutes
* Part II of this note, dealing with judicial disqualifications of adminis-
trators, will appear in the next issue of the Quarterly.
1. 3 Schouler, Wills, Executors and Administrators (6th ed. 1923) 1671,
sec. 1389.
2. Ala. Code (1928) secs. 5730, 5742-5745; Ariz. Rev. Code (1928) secs.
3922-3925, 3992; Ark. Digest of Statutes (Pope's 1937) c. 1, secs. 7-9, 15;Cal. Probate Code (1937) c. 4, art. 1, secs. 420-426, art. 2, sec. 442; Colo.Comp. Laws (1921) secs. 5222, 5228; Conn. Gen. Stats. (1930) sec. 4904;
Del. Rev. Code (1935) secs. 3808-3810; Fla. Comp. Laws (1927) secs. 5521-5526; Ga. Code (1933) c. 113, sees. 1202-1204; Idaho Code (1932) tit. 15,
sees. 312-328; Ill. Smith-Hurd Ann. Stats. (1934) c. 3, see. 18; Ind. Burns
Stats. (1933) tit. 6, sees. 301-304; Iowa Code (1935) secs. 11883, 11884,12066; Kan. Gen. Stats. (1935) c. 22, secs. 312, 328; Ky. Carroll's Stats.
Ann. (1936) secs. 3845, 3896; La. Civil Code (1932) sees. 1042-1046; Me.
Rev. Stats. (1930) c. 76, secs. 18, 25, 27; Md. Ann. Code (1924) art. 93,
secs. 15-29, 53; Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c. 193, secs. 1, 2; Mich. Comp.
Laws (1929) secs. 15586, 15595; Minn. Mason's Stats. (Supp. 1936) secs.8992-68; Miss. Code (1930) sees. 1629, 1630, 1642; R. S. Mo. (1929) sees.6-10, 43, 47; Mont. Rev. Code (1935) secs. 10068-10073; Neb. Comp. Stats.(1929) c. 80, secs. 314, 323; Nev. Comp. Laws (1929) secs. 9637-9641;
N. H. Pub. Laws (1926) c. 299, secs. 2-10; N. J. Rev. Stats. (1937) tit. 3,
c. 7, sec. 6; N. M. Stats. Ann. (1929) c. 47, art. 1, secs. 109-111; N. Y.
Thompson's Laws (1939) Surrogate's Court Act, secs. 94, 118; N. C. Code(1935) secs. 6-15; N. D. Comp. Laws (1913) secs. 1657, 8663; Okla. Stats.(1931) sees. 1135-1149; Ore. Code Ann. (1930) tit. 11, sees. 208-210, 231;Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page's 1926) tit. 3, c. 3, sees. 10629, 10636, 10617,(Supp. 1926-1935) secs. 10509-3; Pa. Purdon's Stats. (1936) tit. 20, secs.
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prescribing the order in which applicants for letters of adminis-
tration should be appointed. Thus, the Missouri statute provides
that
Letters of administration shall be granted: First, to the
husband or wife; secondly, to those who are entitled to dis-
tribution of the estate, or one or more of them, as the court
or judge or clerk in vacation shall believe will best manage
and preserve the estate: Provided, however, if the court, orjudge in vacation, should believe no one of such persons en-
titled to administer is a competent and suitable person, some
other person than those above mentioned may be appointed.4
This section designates those who are theoretically 5 entitled
to be appointed administrator of a decedent's estate. Other sec-
tions provide that certain persons may not be appointed admin-
istrator. Thus, Section 106 provides that letters of administra-
tion shall in no case be granted to a non-resident of the state,
and Section 67 provides that
No judge or clerk of any probate court, in his own coun-
ty, or a deputy, and no male or female person under 21
years of age, or of unsound mind, shall be executor or ad-
ministrator.
343, 344; R. I. Gen. Laws (1923) sees. 5428, 5429; S. C. Code of Laws
(1932) sec. 8968; S. D. Comp. Laws (1929) sees. 3249-3254; Tenn. Code
(1932) sees. 8148, 8151; Tex. Vernon's Stats. Ann. (1936) arts. 3353-3359;
Utah Rev. Stats. (1933) tit. 102, c. 4, secs. 1-5; Va. Code (1936) secs.
5360, 5373; Vt. Pub. Laws (1933) secs. 2775, 2776, 2789; Wash. Reming-
ton's Comp. Stats. (1922) secs. 1431, 1457; W. Va. Code (1932) secs. 4123,
4129; Wis. Stats. (1937) sec. 311.02; Wyo. Rev. Stats. (1931) sees. 18-1701
-18-1704. Citations to particular statutes will not be given hereafter.
Reference will be to the name of the state.
3. The first English statute was passed in 1357. 31 Edw. III, c. 11.
4. R. S. Mo. (1929) see. 7.
5. This right is often more theoretical than real. Thus, in Missouri, if
a preferred person is disregarded for any cause, he is without remedy.
An appeal will not lie, since an order refusing to appoint an applicant
administrator is not within R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 284 (15), providing for
appeal from the probate court to the circuit court. State ex rel. Grover v.
Fowler (1891) 108 Mo. 465, 18 S. W. 960. Mandamus will not lie since
the statute providing for appointment of administrators gives the court
discretion. State ex rel. Thompson v. Nortoni (1917) 269 Mo. 562, 191
S. W. 429; State ex rel. Wilson v. Martin (1930) 223 Mo. App. 1176, 26
S. W. (2d) 834. Of course, if there is an actual or inferential finding that
the preferred applicant is qualified, he must be appointed. For instance,
if a preferred applicant is appointed co-administrator with another person
this is a finding that he is competent and qualified and therefore is entitled
to have sole administration. State ex rel. Gregory v. Henderson (1935) 230
Mo. App. 1, 88 S. W. (2d) 893. And if he is not given the sole appoint-
ment, he may compel it by mandamus. State ex rel. Fansher v. Guinotte
(1933) 227 Mo. App. 902, 58 S. W. (2d) 1005.
6. R. S. Mo. (1929).
7. Ibid.
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Statutory disqualifications of administrators have thus far es-
caped comment in legal periodical literature. They will be the
basis of the discussion in the first portion of this paper. After
them the disqualifications which exist independently of statute
in some states, will be considered.
I. STATUTORY DISQUALIFICATIONS
Minors
Twenty-eight states, including Missouri, provide that a minor
is incompetent to serve as administrator.8 Although this dis-
qualification has not caused any reported litigation, it is probable
that an applicant's status as minor would be determined by his
age at the time of the granting of letters rather than his age at
the time of the intestate's death."
Conviction of Crime
Statutes in four states provide that a person who has been
convicted of a felony is incompetent to serve as administrator, 0
and three other states disqualify persons who have been con-
victed of a felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.,'
These statutes have caused comparatively little trouble; but those
statutes which in fourteen states2 disqualify for conviction1 3 of
an infamous crime have caused a great deal of trouble, since the
courts are unable to agree on the meaning of "infamous".
Garitee v. Bond 4 held that the infamous nature of a crime is
determined by the character of the crime itself and not by the
penalty inflicted for its commission. By this test a conviction
for a misdemeanor can be a conviction for an infamous crime
if the misdemeanor involves moral turpitude.r5 Some courts are
8. Ala., Ariz., Ark., Cal., Colo., Del., Fla., Idaho, Ind., La., Me., Md.,
Miss., Mo., Mont., Nev., N. H., N. M., N. Y., N. C., N. D., Okla., Ore.,
S. D., Tex. (except as to the surviving spouse, who is entitled to admin-
ister even though she is not of age), Utah, Wash., and Wyo. In Georgia
there is an express provision that the surviving spouse should be appointed
regardless of age.
9. See In re Herriot's Estate (1933) 219 Cal. 529, 28 P. (2d) 356, and
In re Halstead's Estate (1937) 282 Mich. 253, 276 N. W. 438, 114 A. L. R.
272.
10. Ind., Miss., N. Y., N. C.
11. N. M., Ore., Wash.
12. Ala., Ariz., Cal., Colo., Fla., Idaho, Md., Mont., Nev., N. D., Okla.,
S. D., Utah, Wyo. See also the Delaware statute, which disqualifies for
conviction of a crime disqualifying the applicant from taking an oath.
13. No degree of legal or moral guilt is sufficient without a conviction.
Coope v. Lowerre (N. Y. 1845) 1 Barb. Ch. 45.
14. (1905) 102 Md. 379, 62 Atl. 631.
15. Garitee v. Bond (1905) 102 Md. 379, 62 At. 631; In re Greene's
Estate (Surr. Ct. 1905) 48 Misc. 31, 96 N. Y. S. 98; In re Dunham's Estate(1937) 181 Okla. 407, 74 P. (2d) 117.
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aided by constitutional provisions that no person shall be held
to answer for an infamous crime unless on presentment or in-
dictment by a grand jury. If the applicant was not indicted by
a grand jury, he could not have been convicted for an infamous
crime and therefore does not fall within the statutory prohibi-
tion. 16 While none of the cases arising under the disqualifying
statutes have so indicated, it is possible that some state courts
will adopt the definition of the United States Supreme Court in
Ex parte Wilson,17 and hold that the true test of infamy is not
the nature of the crime but the nature of the punishment. 8 Un-
der this rule it would not be material whether the conviction was
for a felony or for a misdemeanor; if the court had authority
to inflict an infamous punishment on the applicant, he would be
disqualified even though the punishment actually awarded was
not infamousY9 An infamous punishment has been defined as
imprisonment at hard labor in a state prison or penitentiary.20
There is a division of authority on the question whether con-
viction for a crime committed in another state can be considered
a disqualification. Thus, Estate of O'Brienl held that conviction
of a felony in a sister state could not be considered, while In re
Dunham's Estate22 held that conviction in a sister state of an
infamous crime came within the statutory prohibition. But in
the latter case it was further held that if the crime was not in-
famous by the law of the forum, the applicant would not be dis-
qualified. The question may be asked: Would this latter court
disqualify for conviction in a sister state for a non-infamous
crime if the crime was infamous in the forum? The above hold-
ing would logically compel a disqualification. Would that be the
correct result?
The test of conviction for an infamous crime is undoubtedly
intended as a test of the applicant's character. If he commits
an infamous crime his character is such that he should not be
appointed to a position of trust. But it would seem that this
test is a yardstick of an individual's character only if it be used
in connection with the law of the place where the crime was
committed. The laws of the state where the act was committed
16. Matter of O'Hare (Surr. Ct. 1908) 6 Mills 511, 60 Misc. 269, 113
N. Y. S. 281.
17. (1884) 114 U. S. 417.
18. See In re Dunham's Estate (1937) 181 Okla. 407, 74 P. (2d) 117.
19. Ex parte Wilson (1884) 114 U. S. 417.
20. Ibid.
21. (N. Y. 1884) 3 Dem. Surr. 156. See Garitee v. Bond (1905) 102 Md.
379, 62 AtI. 631.
22. (1937) 181 Okla. 407, 74 P. (2d) 117.
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are conditions bearing on the character of the act, whereas the
laws of the future forum are not. If this analysis is correct, the
nature of the crime in the state where it was committed is the
important consideration. It also follows that conviction for an
infamous crime in a sister state should be a disqualification.
While this result is partially supported by the Dunhcm case
it is opposed by the O'Brien case, and is inconsistent with the
rule of evidence that conviction of crime in a sister state does
not disqualify a witness from testifying in the forum. 23
Unsound Mind
Persons of "unsound mind" 24 or persons who have been "ad-
judged incompetent" 25 are disqualified in twelve states. In Indi-
ana a person who is incapable of making a contract may not be
appointed.
Non-residence
At common law a non-resident was eligible for appointment
as administrator. 26 If he was before the court in order to obtain
the appointment, it was thought reasonably certain that he would
stay within the jurisdiction of the court until the administration
of the estate had been completed. But the increasing mobility of
the individual in recent years has caused difficulties where a non-
resident is appointed administrator. A state can no longer be
sure that the non-resident will remain in the state and continue
to be subject to suit by resident creditors and distributees. A
few states have attempted to solve this problem by providing
that a non-resident shall not be appointed unless he first desig-
nates a resident agent upon whom service of process can be
had,27 or unless he posts a bond.28 Either of these provisions
solves the problem of the disappearing non-resident adminis-
23. 1 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) 939, sec. 522.
24. Ark., Colo., Del., Ga., Md., Miss., Mo., N. M., Ore., Tex.
25. N. Y., Utah.
26. Fulgham v. Fulgham (1898) 119 Ala. 403, 24 So. 851 (changed by
statute); Foley v. Cudahy Packing Co. (1903) 119 Iowa 246, 93 N. W.
284 (but non-residence is a factor to be considered in exercising discretion) ;
Succession of Penney (1855) 10 La. Ann. 290 (but presence within the
state is required by statute); Ehlen v. Ehlen (1885) 64 Md. 360, 1 At].
880 (but the applicant must be a citizen of the United States); In re
McGill (1929) 52 Nov. 35, 280 Pac. 321, 65 A. L. R. 1232; Pickering v.
Pendexter (1865) 46 N. H. 69 (but non-residence is a factor to be con-
sidered) ; Grogan v. O'Neill (1927) 48 R. I. 187, 136 Atl. 842 (changed by
statute); Ex parte Barker (Va. 1830) 2 Leigh 719; 1 Williams, Execu-
tors (5th ed. 1859) 537. Maine has an express statutory provision adopt-
ing the common law rule and allowing a non-resident to act as adminis-
trator.
27. Del., Fla., Pa., Tenn., Vt.
28. Georgia.
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trator; but the majority of states, including Missouri, have not
accepted this solution. Instead, they have passed statutes which
provide that a non-resident may never be appointed administra-
tor.29 The courts, however, have been reluctant to disqualify non-
residents in the absence of clear statutory disqualification. Thus,
under statutes which provide that an administrator may be re-
lieved of office if he "removes" from the state, the majority of
courts have refused to make residence a requirement for ap-
pointment ' on the theory that statutes in derogation of common
law rules should be construed strictlyA1 It is, moreover, perfectly
possible that a non-resident will come into a state and perform
all of his duties without "removing" from the state after his
appointment.32 While this argument is sound theoretically, the
danger that the non-resident will leave the state before the estate
is administered remains very real. This danggr can be avoided
only by refusing to appoint a non-resident or by requiring that
he appoint a resident agent. Since there are no agency provi-
sions in the statutes of this type, the only alternative available
to the courts is to declare that the statutory direction to relieve
the administrator of his office if he "removes" from the state
means that a non-resident should not be appointed in the first
instance.3 3 This rule, advanced by a minority of the courts, is
rationalized on the ground that the court should not perform a
vain act-the court should not appoint a non-resident when it
knows that it will have to remove him immediately. 34 There is,
however, nothing to support the basic supposition of these courts
29 Ala., Ariz., Ark., Cal., Kan., Idaho, Ill., Mo., Mont., Neb., N. M.,
N. C., Ohio, R. I., Utah, Wash., Wyo. New Hampshire provides that a
non-resident may be appointed in proper circumstances, and New York dis-
qualifies only non-resident aliens.
30. Brown v. Brown (1920) 204 Ala. 157, 85 So. 439; Chicago, B. & Q.
Ry. v. Gould (1884) 64 Iowa 343, 20 N. W. 464; In re Bailey's Estate
(1909) 31 Nev. 377, 103 Pac. 232; Stevens v. Cameron (1907) 100 Tex.
515, 101 S. W. 791; Bridgman v. Bridgman (1887) 30 W. Va. 212, 3 S. E.
580; In re Peele's Estate (1910) 85 S. C. 140, 67 S. E. 135; cf. Burkhim
v. Pinkhussohn (1900) 58 S. C. 469, 36 S. E. 908. Contra: Fishel v. Dixon(1926) 212 Ky. 2, 278 S. W. 545; In re Estate of Ulhorn (1894) 12 Ohio
Cir. Ct. 765, 4 Ohio Cir. Dec. 526. Cf.: In re Brennan (1898) 5 Ohio Nisi
Prius 490, 5 Ohio Dec. 499, holding that the statutory grounds for removing
are not to be considered in determining qualifications for appointment;
Sarkie's Appeal (1845) 2 Pa. 157.
31. In re Peele's Estate (1910) 85 S. C. 140, 67 S. E. 135.
32. Stevens v. Cameron (1907) 100 Tex. 515, 101 S. W. 791.
33. Fishel v. Dixon (1926) 212 Ky. 2, 278 S. W. 545; In re Estate of
Ulhorn (1894) 12 Ohio Cir. Ct. 765, 4 Ohio Cir. Dec. 526; Sarkie's Appeal
(1845) 2 Pa. 157.
34. In re Estate of Ulhorn (1894) 12 Ohio Cir. Ct. 765, 4 Ohio Cir. Dec.
526.
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that the non-resident will actually remove from the state after
he is appointed and before the administration is completed.
Even in those states which do not absolutely disqualify a non-
resident, non-residence is usually considered an "unfavorable cir-
cumstance." 35 This is especially true where there are resident
distributees or resident creditors, 6 or where the estate is very
large and requires a great deal of attention.37 In such cases the
court may, in its discretion, refuse to appoint a non-resident
applicant.
The rules for determining residence in conflict of laws prob-
lems generally, apply to cases under the statutes here involved.
But there has been a sufficient number of cases in this branch
of the law to make possible the statement of several specific
propositions. The courts usually require the residence to be
bona fide,38 even where the statutes do not so provide.31 To estab-
lish a bona fide residence there must be a union of act and in-
tent.-0 Since the applicant will always be physically present, the
only question is that of the applicant's intent. This intent can
be shown by acts as well as by statements.41 Expressed intent
to stay within the state only so long as will be required for the
administration of the estate is insufficient, since intent to reside
permanently in the state is not shown.42 Conversely, an ex-
pressed intent to reside permanently within the state is sufficient
alone to justify a finding that the applicant is a bona fide resi-
dent of the state.43 This intent, plus the fact that the applicant
does not have a home elsewhere, is even more clearly sufficient. 4 4
35. In re Estate of Rugh (1931) 211 Iowa 722, 234 N. W. 278. See also
Foley v. Cudahy Packing Co. (1903) 119 Iowa 246, 93 N. W. 284.
36. Ex parte Barker (Va. 1830) 2 Leigh 719.
37. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Gould (1884) 64 Iowa 343, 20 N. W. 464.
38. Estate of Newman (1899) 124 Cal. 688, 57 Pac. 686; Stevens v.
Larwill (1904) 110 Mo. App. 140, 84 S. W. 113. See In re Cardoner's
Estate (1921) 27 N. M. 337, 201 Pac. 1051, 18 A. L. R. 575, which con-
strued a statute disqualifying non-residents as not requiring a bona fide
residence within the state.
39. E. g., Ga., Neb., and R. I.
40. In re Estate of Nix (1923) 66 Mont. 559, 564, 213 Pac. 1089. Cf.:
Becker v. Orr (1909) 243 Ill. 77, 90 N. E. 181, holding that residence
was lost as soon as intent to leave was formed, although the applicant had
never left the state; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (2d ed. 1938) 38, sec. 23.
41. In re Gordon's Estate (1904) 142 Cal. 125, 75 Pac. 672.
42. In re Mulford (1905) 217 Ill. 242, 75 N. E. 345, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.)
341, 108 Am. St. Rep. 249, 3 Ann. Cas. 986.
43. Estate of Newman (1899) 124 Cal. 688, 57 Pac. 686; Headman v.
Rose (1879) 63 Ga. 458; In re Myer's Estate (1932) 92 Mont. 474, 17 P.
(2d) 846.
44. In re Gordon's Estate (1904) 142 Cal. 125, 75 Pac. 672; In re Estate
of Nix (1923) 66 Mont. 559, 213 Pac. 1089.
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However, an expression of intent to reside permanently within
the state can be overcome by showing that the applicant has a
home and family in another state.45 Entering the state before
the intestate's death tends to show a bon fide intent ;46 on the
other hand, entering the state only after death and for the pur-
pose of administering the estate may be evidence of a lack of
it. 47 Of course, if there is actually a bona fide residence within
the state, the fact that the residence was established for the sole
purpose of obtaining letters of administration is immaterial.48
In all cases there is a distinct tendency on the part of the ap-
pellate courts to accept conclusively the trial court's determina-
tion of residence.49
Character Qualifications
Statutes in thirteen states provide that no person is competent
to serve as administrator who is "adjudged by the court incom-
petent to execute the duties of the trust by reason of drunken-
ness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity."5
Each of these statutory disqualifications will be considered in
turn.
Drunkenness. The drunkenness-1 which disqualifies is not oc-
casional 2 or even frequent53 use of intoxicating liquors. The vital
question is whether the applicant is by reason of habitual and
excessive use of intoxicants so incompetent as to render him an
unsafe guardian of property.54 It is only when habits of drink
are carried so far as to cloud the brain and weaken respect for
honesty and integrity that the courts will disqualify for drunken-
ness.-
45. In re Donovan's Estate (1894) 104 Cal. 623, 38 Pac. 456; In re
Barnes' Estate (1921) 187 Cal. 566, 203 Pac. 100; In re Gordon's Estate
(1904) 142 Cal. 125, 75 Pac. 672.
46. In re Gordon's Estate (1904) 142 Cal. 125, 75 Pac. 672.
47. In re Mulford (1904) 217 Ill. 242, 75 N. E. 345, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.)
341, 108 Am. St. Rep. 249, 3 Ann. Cas. 986; In re Fellin's Estate (1919)
108 Wash. 626, 185 Pac. 604.
48. Stevens v. Larwill (1904) 110 Mo. App. 140, 84 S. W. 113; In re
Estate of Nix (1923) 66 Mont. 559, 213 Pac. 1089.
49. See cases cited supra, notes 41 to 48.
50. Ala., Ariz., Cal., Idaho, Mont., Nev., N. Y., N. C., N. D., Okla.,
S. D., Utah, Wyo.
51. Colorado and Indiana also disqualify for "drunkenness," while Florida
disqualifies for "intemperance." In Martin v. Otis (1919) 233 Mass. 491,
124 N. E. 294, 6 A. L. R. 1340, the court considered the use of intoxi-
cants although it was not made a disqualification by statute.
52. Root v. Davis (1890) 10 Mont. 228, 25 Pac. 105; In re Manley's
Estate (Surr. Ct. 1895) 12 Misc. 472, 34 N. Y. S. 258.
53. In re Reichert's Estate (Surr. Ct. 1901) 34 Misc. 288, 69 N. Y. S.
644.
54. Root v. Davis (1890) 10 Mont. 228, 25 Pac. 105.
55. In re Reichert's Estate (Surr. Ct. 1901) 34 Misc. 288, 69 N. Y. S.
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Improvidence. In the leading case of Coope v. Lowerre, ° im-
providence is defined as "that want of care or foresight, in the
management of property, which would be likely to render the
estate and effects of the intestate unsafe, and liable to be lost,
or diminished in value."' 57 By this test, the only material con-
sideration is whether the applicant will be able properly to man-
age and preserve the estate. Thus it has been held that insolv-
ency of the applicant is some evidence of improvidence, although
not alone sufficient5 8 Similarly, a professional gambler is improv-
ident since in the exigencies of games of chance he may possibly
lose the estate's property as well as his ownA9 Neither abandon-
ment of family,60 nor dishonesty, nor thievery0 ' shows improvi-
dence since none of these qualities, it is said, indicates inability
to manage and preserve an estate. It has been stated that the
improvidence which disqualifies must amount to a lack of intelli-
gence,6 2 but this does not seem to be a sound interpretation of
the statutes. An "intelligent" person might well be wasteful or
negligent in reference to the care, management, and preservation
of property.63
Want of Understanding. The want of understanding" which
disqualifies an applicant must amount to a lack of intelligence.",
Thus neither old age66 nor illiteracy 67 is sufficient to disqualify,
even though either may render it difficult for the applicant prop-
erly to perform the duties of an administrator. But want of
understanding is established when it is shown that the appli-
56. (N. Y. 1845) 1 Barb. Ch. 45.
57. In addition to the thirteen states enumerated supra, note 50, Indiana
provides that an improvident applicant is disqualified.
58. Coope v. Lowerre (N. Y. 1845) 1 Barb. Ch. 45. Cf.: In re Ferguson(Surr. Ct. 1903) 41 Misc. 465, 84 N. Y. S. 1102, which held that the fact
that the applicant was unable to accumulate any property was sufficient
evidence of improvidence; In re Brinckmann's Estate (Surr. Ct. 1915) 89
Misc. 41, 152 N. Y. S. 542, holding that improvidence was not shown, under
the facts of the case, by proof that the applicant had lost his real estate.
59. M Mahon v. Harrison (N. Y. 1851) 10 Barb. 659, aff'd (1852) 6
N. Y. 443.
60. Nichols v. Smith (1914) 186 Ala. 587, 65 So. 30.
61. Estate of O'Brien (N. Y. 1884) 3 Dem. Surr. 156. See In re Connor's
Estate (1895) 110 Cal. 408, 42 Pac. 906, and Root v. Davis (1890) 10 Mont.
228, 25 Pac. 105, for a discussion of the relationship of drunkenness to im-
providence.
62. In re Schwartz's Estate (Surr. Ct. 1930) 138 Misc. 537, 246 N. Y. S.
478. See Matter of Flood (1923) 236 N. Y. 408, 140 N. E. 936.
63. Root v. Davis (1890) 10 Mont. 228, 25 Pac. 105.
64. In addition to the thirteen states enumerated in note 50, supra,
Florida disqualifies for want of understanding.
65. In re Greene's Estate (Surr. Ct. 1905) 48 Misc. 31, 96 N. Y. S. 98;
Matter of Berrien (N. Y. 1885) 3 Dem. Surr. 263.
66. Estate of Pacheco (1863) 23 Cal. 466.
67. Ibid.
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cant suffers from hallucinations, that he is forgetful, that his
mind wanders, and that he is apt to be imposed upon.68 It has
been held that an applicant lacks understanding when he has
not the requisite "understanding" of the duties and responsibili-
ties accompanying the position of administrator. 69 But this rule,
which is stricter than the lack of intelligence test, would prob-
ably disqualify most, if not all, widows even though they are
expressly preferred by all the statutes. It would be something
of an anomaly to give the widow a statutory preference only to
refuse it judicially because she did not thoroughly understand
the law and business connected with the administration of an
estate.
Want of Integrity. Integrity, in the phrase "want of integ-
rity,"70 has been defined as follows:
" * * * soundness of moral principles and public character,
as shown by a person's dealings with others, in the making
and performance of contracts, in fidelity and honesty in the
discharge of trusts. In short, it is used as a synonym for
probity, honesty, and uprightness in business relations with
others."71
By this definition, integrity in business relations is the sole test;
an applicant's private life cannot be scrutinized. The courts have
consistently followed this narrow definition. Lack of integrity
is not shown by adultery or bigamy,72 by the fact that the appli-
cant contends that the entire estate of the intestate was a gift
to him7 3 or by the bad faith intrinsic in applying for the sole
purpose of depriving another person of his statutory rights.74
Strangely enough, no case has been found in which the applicant
was found wanting in integrity.
Coverture
The majority of states have by statute7 5 or decision, 7 estab-
lished the rule that a married woman may be appointed admin-
68. In re Johnson's Estate (1920) 182 Cal. 642, 189 Pac. 280.
69. In re Phyfe's Estate (Surr. Ct. 1920) 115 Misc. 699, 182 N. Y. S.
729.
70. Of the thirteen states mentioned in note 50, supra, Alabama, New
York, and North Carolina omit the disqualification for want of integrity.
71. In re Bauquier's Estate (1891) 88 Cal. 302, 307, 26 Pac. 178. In
In re Dunham's Estate (1937) 181 Okla. 407, 74 P. (2d) 117, the court
said by way of dictum that violation of a statute of a sister state might be
sufficient evidence of lack of integrity.
72. Estate of Newman (1899) 124 Cal. 688, 50 Pac. 686.
73. Estate of Carmody (1891) 88 Cal. 616, 26 Pac. 373.
74. In re McCausland's Estate (1915) 170 Cal. 134, 148 Pac. 924.
75. Ala., Cal., Del., Fla., Ga., Idaho, Iowa, Ky., Me., Md., Mont., N. H.,
Ohio, S. D., Vt., W. Va., Wyo.
76. Richard v. Mills (1856) 31 Miss. 450; Matter of Curser (1882) 89
N. Y. 401 (decision based on Married Woman's Act); In re Nurnberger
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istratrix. The contrary rule has been adopted by statute in North
Dakota and Utah. In Virginia it is provided that upon marriage
a woman may be removed on motion of an interested party; in
Nevada, removal is permitted on this ground on motion of the
party next entitled to administer.
Interest in Distribution
Statutes in seventeen states, including Missouri, provide that
the applicant must be a person entitled to share in the distribu-
tion of the intestate's property.J7 Statutes in twenty-one other
states provide that the next of kin of the intestate should be
appointed.7 8 Under the second type of statute it is settled that
the term "next of kin" means those persons who take the per-
sonal estate of the deceased under the statutes of distribution.0
Under both types of statutes, therefore, the applicant must be
a distributee of the intestate's property. 80 In nine of the remain-
ing ten states it is provided that letters of administration should
be given to certain enumerated persons, such as the surviving
spouse, the children, the father or mother, the brothers, et
cetera.8, A final catch-all phrase is then included-"the next of
kin entitled to distribution." 82 It is clear that if none of the enu-
merated persons are before the court the same result will be
reached as in the two types of cases previously mentioned, since
the right to administer is given only to the next of kin entitled
to share in the estate. But what is the result where one of the
named persons applies for letters of administration, when he is
(1894) 40 S. C. 334, 18 S. E. 935 (decision based on Married Woman's
Act); Webb v. Deedham (1823) 1 Add. 494, 164 Eng. Rep. 175. Contra,
Watkins v. Watkin's Adm'r (1910) 136 Ky. 266, 124 S. W. 301.
77. Ala., Ark., Cal., Del., Fla., Ky., La., Miss., Mo., Mont., N. M., N. Y.,
Pa., Utah, Va., W. Va., Wyo. The Missouri statute does not expressly re-
quire that the surviving spouse have an interest in the estate.
78. Colo., Conn., Ga., Ind., Iowa, Kan., Me., Mass., Mich., Minn., Neb.,
N. H., N. J., N. C., Ore., Ohio, R. I., Tenn., Tex., Vt., Wis.
79. In re Weaver's Estate (1909) 140 Iowa 615, 119 N. W. 69, 22 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 1161, 17 Ann. Cas. 947; State ex rel. Cowley v. Superior Court
(1930) 158 Wash. 546, 291 Pac. 481, 70 A. L. R. 1460.
80. In re Eggers (1896) 114 Cal. 464, 46 Pac. 380; In re Weaver's
Estate (1909) 140 Iowa 615, 119 N. W. 69, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1161, 17
Ann. Cas. 947; Hilton v. Hilton (1908) 33 Ky. Law 276, 109 S. W. 905;
In re Rechtschaffen's Estate (1938) 278 N. Y. 336, 16 N. E. (2d) 357;
cf. In re Estate of D'Admomo (1914) 212 N. Y. 214, 106 N. E. 81, which
arose under an old statute and which held that an interest in the estate
was unnecessary. Accord: Colbert v. Thornley (R. I. 1908) 71 At. 65;
In re Bartz's Estate (1932) 207 Wis. 639, 242 N. W. 171.
81. Ariz., Idaho, Ill., Md., Nev., N. D., Okla., S. C., S. D.
82. The express requirement that the next of kin be entitled to share in
the distribution is omitted in the Illinois and Maryland statutes. But this
omission does not cause a change in result. See cases cited supra, note 79.
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not entitled to share in the intestate's estate? It has been held
that the named person must be appointed even though this inter-
est is lacking.2 This is contrary to the cardinal maxim that the
person with the greatest interest in the estate should be ap-
pointed administrator, since he will presumably exercise the
greatest care in administering the estate for the benefit of all
the creditors and distributees. Washington has avoided this un-
fortunate result by providing in its statute that the next of kin
should be appointed, with named persons being entitled to prefer-
ence. This statute has some of the characteristics of the second
type mentioned above. If the named person is the next of kin,
that is, entitled to a distributive share, he is entitled to admin-
ister; otherwise he is not.
In almost all circumstances, therefore, the applicant must be
entitled to a portion of the intestate's property. Thus, if the dis-
tributee has already received his share of the property, 4 or has
pledged his share,85 he is not entitled to the letters of adminis-
tration. Thus, too, if a widow has surrendered her right to the
property of the deceased spouse by a valid ante- 6 or post-nup-
tial 7 contract, she is not entitled to administer his estate.88
83. Orear v. Crum (1890) 135 Ill. 294, 25 N. E. 1097; MeColgan v.
Kenny (1888) 68 Md. 258, 11 Atl. 819. See State ex rel. Scanland v.
Thompson (1916) 196 Mo. App. 12, 187 S. W. 804. But where the surviv-
ing spouse has agreed in the ante-nuptial contract not to "control" the
property of the intestate either before or after his death, the right of
administration is lost. In re Evan's Estate (1906) 117 Mo. App. 629, 93
S. W. 922.
84. Moody v. Moody (1859) 29 Ga. 519.
85. Sarkie's Appeal (1845) 2 Pa. 157.
86. Maurer v. Nail (1854) 5 Md. 324; In re Bunimoivitz's Estate (Surr.
Ct. 1927) 128 Misc. 518, 219 N. Y. S. 763; In re Friese's Estate (1935)
317 Pa. 86, 176 Atl. 225; Goock v. Suhor (1917) 121 Va. 35, 92 S. E. 843;
Charles v. Charles (1852) 49 Va. 486. The ante-nuptial contract must be
valid. Thus, it cannot be obtained by fraud or concealment of the assets
of the prospective spouse. Warner's Estate (1904) 207 Pa. 580, 57 At.
35, 99 Am. St. Rep. 804.
87. In re Davis (1895) 106 Cal. 453, 39 Pac. 756; In re Berner (1922)
217 Mich. 612, 187 N. W. 377. Contra: Garretson v. Garretson (1890) 2
Ohio Cir. Dec. 581, in which the right to administer was granted on the
ground that the widow was still entitled to her statutory one year's allow-
ance. Where the parties do not obtain a divorce, it is essential that the
right to future property acquired by the husband also be given up in order
to deprive the widow of the right to administer. Willis v. Jones (1875)
42 Md. 422. The contract must be valid. Thus, in Nusz v. Grove (1867)
27 Md. 391, the widow was allowed to administer on the ground that the
post-nuptial contract was invalid since a married woman did not have
capacity to contract.
88. The courts apparently ignore the fact that the statutes designate
that the surviving spouse should be appointed, and that the next of kin
should next be preferred. Interest would only be necessary in determining
who is the next of kin; it would not be necessary in determining who is
NOTES19401
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol26/iss1/13
118 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 26
Miscellaneous
In nine states statutes provide that the surviving business
partner of the deceased shall not be appointed administrator 9
In North Carolina, a surviving spouse who lived apart in adul-
tery is not entitled to administer, nor is a husband who aban-
doned his wife.
It is thq weight of authority that the statutory grounds for
removing administrators must be considered statutory disquali-
fications for appointment.90 Conversely, it will be found that
most of the statutory and common law disqualifications herein
discussed are also grounds for removal in many states.91
Exclusiveness of Statutory Disqualifications
Are the statutory disqualifications exclusive, or can the courts
engraft upon the statutes other disqualifications? Must the ap-
plicant be appointed if he does not fall within one of the statu-
tory disqualifications? The answer to these questions depends to
a large extent on the wording of the particular statute.
the surviving spouse. But it might be said that the statute shows an "in-
tent" that the surviving spouse have an interest, because of provisions
requiring that members of subsequent classes have an interest.
89. Ariz., Cal., Idaho, Mont., N. D., Okla., S. D., Utah, Wyo. Heward v.
Slagle (1869) 52 Ill. 336, held that the surviving partner was disqualified
at common law.
90. Schwarze v. Logan (1939) 60 Idaho 251, 90 P. (2d) 692; In re
Daggett (1908) 15 Idaho 504, 98 Pac. 849; Hunt v. Crocker (1932) 246
Ky. 338, 55 S. W. (2d) 20; Fishel v. Dixon (1926) 212 Ky. 2, 278 S. W.
545; Stearns v. Fiske (1836) 35 Mass. 24; In re Diller's Application (1896)
6 Ohio Dec. 182; In re Estate of Ulhorn (1894) 4 Ohio Cir. Dec. 526, with
which compare In re Brennan (1898) 5 Ohio Dec. 499; Ex parte Small
(1903) 69 S. C. 43, 48 S. E. 40; Burkhim v. Pinkhussohn (1900) 58 S. C.
469, 36 S. E. 908; In re Sargent (1885) 62 Wis. 130, 22 N. W. 131. Con-
tra: Sampson v. Sampson (1932) 44 Ga. App. 803, 163 S. E. 326; Chicago,
B. & Q. Ry. v. Gould (1884) 64 Iowa 343, 20 N. W. 464; In re Brennan
(1898) 5 Ohio Dec. 499; Stevens v. Cameron (1907) 100 Tex. 515, 101
S. W. 791. See State ex rel. Abercrombie v. Holtcamp (1916) 267 Mo.
412, 185 S. W. 201, Ann. Cas. 1918D 454. But see cases cited supra note
30, holding that statutes requiring removal of administrators who become
non-residents do not prevent the appointment of non-residents in the first
instance.
91. Thus, R. S. Mo. (1929) see. 43 provides that "If an executor or
administrator becomes of unsound mind, or be convicted of any felony or
other infamous crime, or has absented himself from the state for the space
of four months, or become an habitual drunkard, or in anywise incapable
or unsuitable to execute the trust reposed in him, or fail to discharge his
official duties, or waste or mismanage the estate, or act so as to endanger
any co-executor or co-administrator or fails to answer any citation and
attachment to make a settlement, the court upon complaint in writing made
by any person interested, supported by affidavit and ten days notice given
to such executor or administrator, as prescribed in section 275 of this
chapter, shall hear the complaint, and, if it finds it just, shall revoke the
letters granted."
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Statutes in seven states provide that the designated person
"must" be appointed,92 while statutes in fifteen other states pro-
vide that the designated person "shall" be appointed. 93 Since
there are no discretionary provisions in either of these types of
statutes, it would seem that the statutes are mandatory. This
is the weight of authority.24 Nevertheless, under the second type
of statute the courts of South Carolina95 Tennessee, 6 and Wash-
ington have held that the preferred person need not be ap-
pointed if unsuitable or unqualified for reasons other than those
set out in the statute.9 8 These courts disregard the plain terms
of the statutes on the theory that the protection of the estate
is the primary duty of the courts, and that the statutory prefer-
ences may be disregarded if the estate would be jeopardized by
the appointment of the preferred person. 9
All the statutes except the two types mentioned above give
some discretion to the courts in the selection of an administrator.
92. Ala., Idaho, Mont., N. Y., Okla., S. D., Wyo.
93. Ariz., Fla., Ill., Ind., Ky., La., Nev., N. J., N. M., N. C., S. C.,
Tenn., Va., Wash., Wis.
94. Johnston v. Pierson (1934) 229 Ala. 85, 155 So. 695; Bell v. Fulgham
(1918) 202 Ala. 217, 80 So. 39; In re Brundage's Estate (1904) 141 Cal.
538, 75 Pac. 175, the rule of which was changed by subsequent statute
which is interpreted in In re St. John's Estate (1937) 8 Cal. (2d) 175,
64 P. (2d) 725; Hayes v. Hayes (1881) 75 Ind. 395; State v. Jeffries(1925) 83 Ind. App. 524, 149 N. E. 373; Hood v. Higgins Curator (1928)
225 Ky. 718, 9 S. W. (2d) 1078, with which compare Hunt v. Crocker(1932) 246 Ky. 338, 55 S. W. (2d) 20, which held that the statutory
grounds for removal could be considered as statutory disqualifications;
Stouffer v. Stouffer (1909) 110 Md. 868, 72 Atl. 843, with which compare
the present Maryland statute, supra note 2, amended after this decision
to give discretion to the court; In re Carney's Estate (1914) 83 N. J. Eq.
615, 91 Atl. 598, with which compare In re Messler's Estate (1938) 16
N. J. Misc. 434, 1 A. (2d) 322; In re McLure's Estate (1922) 63 Mont.
536, 208 Pac. 900; In re Campbell (1908) 192 N. Y. 312, 85 N. E. 392,
18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 606; In re Rouse's Estate (1918) 71 Okla. 296, 176
Pac. 954; Dooley v. Dooley (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) 240 S. W. 1112; Murphy
v. Karnes (1921) 88 W. Va. 242, 106 S. E. 655, 70 A. L. R. 1471; Welsh v.
Manwaring (1904) 120 Wis. 377, 98 N. W. 214. See: Estate of Webb(1932) 90 Colo. 470, 10 P. (2d) 947; In re Owen's Estate (1906) 30 Utah
351, 85 Pac. 277.
95. Ex parte Small (1903) 69 S. C. 43, 48 S. E. 40.
96. Fitzgerald v. Smith (1904) 112 Tenn. 176, 78 S. W. 1050.
97. In re Estate of Thomas (1932) 167 Wash. 127, 8 P. (2d) 963; In
re Langill's Estate (1921) 117 Wash. 268, 201 Pac. 28. See In re Stott's
Estate (1925) 133 Wash. 100, 233 Pac. 280 (criticism of the Langill case);
In re Messler's Estate (1938) 16 N. J. Misc. 434, 1 A. (2d) 322; Dooley v.
Dooley (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) 240 S. W. 1112. In Smith v. Lurty (1907)
107 Va. 548, 59 S. E. 403, the court disqualified for a cause not prescribed
in the statute. In effect, therefore, the statute was not construed as man-
datory.
98. Ex parte Small (1903) 69 S. C. 43, 48 S. E. 40.
99. In re Langill's Estate (1921) 117 Wash. 268, 201 Pac. 28.
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Thus, statutes in eleven states prescribe that certain persons
"shall" be appointed if "suitable,"loo while statutes in six other
states provide that the preferred person need not be appointed
if he is "unqualified,"''1 1 "incapable,' ' 0 2 "incompetent," 103 or "la-
boring under a disability."10' 4 Other statutes more plainly grant
the courts discretion. 0 5 For example the Maryland and Oregon
statutes state that the named person "shall" be appointed in the
court's discretion, while the Connecticut and Utah °06 statutes
provide that the preferred person may be rejected for good and
sufficient reason. Where the statutes can be reasonably inter-
preted as allowing discretion, the courts are not hesitant to exer-
cise it. 10
7
In states in which the statutes are construed to be mandatory
and the statutory disqualifications exclusive, nothing but the
statutory disqualifications need be considered. In the remaining
states, however, the statutory grounds of disqualification are not
exclusive and an applicant may be disqualified for other reasons.
The causes for refusing to appoint an applicant who is otherwise
preferred, in states where the courts have discretion, will next
be considered.
EDWIN M. ScHAEFRn, JR.
(To be continued)
100. Iowa, Kan., Me., Minn., Mo., Mich., Neb., N. H., Ohio, R. I., Vt.
101. Ark., Miss., Tex.
102. Delaware.
103. Pa. See also the North Carolina statute.
104. Georgia.
105. Cal., Colo., Conn., Md., Mass., N. D., Ore., Utah, W. Va.
106. See In re Owen's Estate (1906) 30 Utah 351, 85 Pac. 277, which
held the statute mandatory although it expressly allowed discretion by the
use of the term "may."
107. In re St. John's Estate (1937) 8 Cal. (2d) 175, 64 P. (2d) 725;
Eva v. Gough (1918) 93 Conn. 38, 104 Atl. 238; Moody v. Moody (1859)
29 Ga. 519; In re Tracy's Estate (1932) 214 Iowa 881, 243 N. W. 309;
O'Neill v. Read (1917) 179 Iowa 1208, 162 N. W. 775; Morgan v. Morgan
(1929) 267 Mass. 388, 166 N. E. 747; In re Abramovitz's Estate (1936)
278 Mich. 271, 270 N. W. 294; Pickering v. Pendexter (1865) 46 N. H.
69; In re Messler's Estate (1938) 16 N. J. Misc. 434, 1 A. (2d) 322;
Territory v. Valdez (1872) 1 N. M. 533 (but see the present statute, supra
note 2) ; Ellis v. Ellis (1919) 42 N. D. 535, 174 N. W. 76; Warner's Estate
(1904) 207 Pa. 580, 57 Atl. 35, 99 Am. St. Rep. 804; In re Schmidt (1897)
183 Pa. 129, 38 Atl. 464; Ex parte Small (1904) 69 S. C. 43, 45, 48 S. E.
40.
Washington University Open Scholarship
